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HUMAN SPAN-OF-CONTROL IN CYBER OPERATIONS: AN EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
OF FAN-OUT
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Modern cyber operations require operators to maintain supervisory control of remote
computer agents. A current operational concern is the number of agents an operator can
control at once. This issue resonates with similar “span-of-control” research conducted in
UAV operations (e.g., Cummings & Mitchel, 2008). One way to identify operator span is
via “fan-out,” a numeric calculation that provides a span-of-control estimate based on
system and environmental variables. However, fan-out is a mechanical representation that
only accounts for task-characteristics and environmental variables, thus providing an
upper bound of human performance that does account for cognition, workload, or work
interruptions. The present study compares fan-out estimates against actual human
performance in a supervisory control cyber task. Results are discussed and future
research trajectories proposed.
Over the last decade, cyber security has become a primary concern for homeland security. This
concern is only likely to grow as we continue to develop technologies that employ computer networks to
manage our major private (e.g., banking) and government (e.g., nuclear power plant) assets.
Traditionally, cyber security research focuses mostly on computer science and engineering
problems, such as the development of algorithms and systems to detect, identify, and mitigate specific
threats that exist on computer networks. While this research is critical to our national defense, it does not
acknowledge the critical role that human operators play in cyber security. Recently, the Human Factors
community has recognized this critical research gap and in response has started an initiative to explore
human-centered aspects of cyber operations. Current research has focused on identifying important
dimensions of cognition within cyber operations, such as situation awareness (Giacobe, 2012), team
knowledge structures (Mancuso & McNeese, 2012), and team collaboration (Rajivan et al, 2013).
However, little research has focused explicitly on specific issues related to task load and individual
operations management.
Current cyber operations exist within a complex system of human-machine interaction, where
operators are tasked with monitoring the activities, efficacy, and progress of intelligent and autonomous
computer systems (Tyworth et al., 2013). In these environments, cyber operators supervise intelligent
systems as they execute tasks across the network. This task places significant cognitive demand on
operators due to the need to maintain situation awareness while dividing attention across a set of dynamic
tasks and managing a deluge of information. While novel within the context of human-centered cyber
research, these environments share many commonalities with human supervisory control tasks.
In Human Supervisory Control (HSC) tasks, a human-in-the-loop provides an autonomous asset
with high-level plans, instructions, and goal directives (Miller, 2004). In operations such as Unmanned
Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), a task that is currently performed using manual control but will likely shift to
HSC (at least partially) in next-gen operations, researchers have examined human performance in HSC
simulations to improve system design, mitigate operator workload, account for individual differences, and
identify/optimize human span-of-control. However, similar research has not been conducted on cyber
operations despite that fact that current-gen work environments often involve HSC tasks.
Based on this, the purpose of this research was to conduct a preliminary exploration of the
translation of previous HSC research to cyber operations. Specifically, in this paper we perform an
experimental evaluation of the predictive span-of-control metric known as “fan-out.” To assess fan-out’s

potential application for cyber-operations, we will compare fan-out estimates against observed human
performance in a cyber supervisory control task that requires human operators to control multiple
automated agents across a simulated area network.
Fan-Out
Nehme et al. (2008) and Cummings & Mitchel (2008) developed a work-flow model of HSC
tasks that parse performance into three components: service time, productive time, and wait time. Service
time, also known as interaction time (IT) is the amount of time that it takes a human to service an
autonomous asset. This value includes the amount of time it takes an operator to allocate the asset,
determine the necessary inputs, and expresses those inputs to the asset via the interface (Olsen &
Goodrich, 2003). Next, productive time, also known as neglect time (NT), represents the average amount
of time an asset can operate without an operator’s intervention (Olsen & Goodrich, 2003). Finally, wait
time (WT) is the amount of time that an asset spends in the queue waiting to be serviced by the human.
Maximum efficiency can be achieved by minimizing service and wait times, while maximizing
productive time.
To help improve HSC systems for maximal performance, some of the variables mentioned above
are combined to obtain computational estimates of fan-out (FO) according to the equation, FO = (NT / IT)
+1 (Dixon, Wickens & Chang, 2005; Miller, 2004; Olsen & Goodrich, 2003; Sheridan, 1992). From a
linear throughput perspective, FO indicates the number of homogenous assets a single operator can
control at once without interference or drag (Olsen & Wood, 2004). Thus, FO can (and has been) used as
a theoretical upper bound for estimates of operator span-of-control. For example, Cummings & Mitchell
(2008) found that operators performed at approximately 36% below fan-out estimates in a UAV
simulation and speculated three reasons for sub-optimal performance: a) WT in the human decisionmaking queue (WTQ), b) interaction wait time (WTI), and c) wait time due to loss of situation awareness
(WTSA). WTQ occurs when an asset goes unattended while an operator completes their decision making
task. WTI, which is very similar to IT, includes time that the operator spends determining the appropriate
action and communicating it to the asset. Finally, WTSA includes time that the operator spends away
from the asset as they perceive elements in the environment, comprehends their meanings and makes
future predictions of their status. While conceptually quite simple, capturing these metrics for the purpose
of predicting human span of control in a computational model can be quite complex, especially WTQ and
WTSA.
Based on such evidence, we expected that, assuming accurate inputs, that estimates of FO in a
cyber HSC simulation (BotNET Operator Ratio Determination; BOARD v1.5) would correlate with
human span-of-control. However, due to the inherent complexity of cyber-operations, we also expected
that actual span-of-control will be significantly lower than the estimates generated by the fan-out equation.
Together, these finds would allow us to pinpoint the theoretical and realistic span-of-control for HSC
cyber operations.
Methods
Simulated Task Environment
BOARD is a human-in-the-loop scaled world simulation that is set in the context of cyber
supervisory control operations. In this simulation, participants are tasked with remotely controlling
computer agents using a command line interface. During the tasks, participants interact with three main
components: a) the agent control window, b) the agent beacon monitor, and c) the mission commander
messaging system (Figure 1).

Figure 1. The BOARD simulation user interface depicting the agent control window (a), the agent beacon monitor (b), and the
mission commander messaging system(c)

These interface elements allow participants to remotely control computer agents using a set list of
commands, monitor the progress and state of varying missions, and communicate with a mission
commander to obtain permission to execute restricted commands.
At the start of each experimental trial of BOARD performed in this experiment, participants
received an Operating Tasking Order (OTO) print out and were given access to a set of computer agents.
Each OTO comprised a mission set, where missions within the set were characterized by an assigned
“agent type” and three steps that must be accomplished (in serial order) to successfully complete the
mission (see Table 1 for an example). In each mission step, participants were provided with a command
they must execute and an authorization code to run the command. In order to complete the mission, the
participant needed complete all three steps in order, using an agent of the correct type. If they enter the
incorrect authorization code, the command may not execute and they cannot complete the mission.
Table 1.
Example BOARD Operating Tasking Orders.

1
2
3

Type
Delta
Sigma
Delta

Step 1
getlog "yxdembfl"
getlog "hlhsggwg"
bc_add "hihhohwv"

Step 2
grab "xtizjluw"
rename "lgxustfx"
bc_add "upfyvedo"

Step 3
phish "sblukllp"
bl_url "rahtdkcl"
rexec

In some cases, authorization codes were not provided to participants (e.g. Mission 3, Step 3 in
Table 1). In these instances, the participant was forced to utilize the Mission Commander Messaging
system to request an authorization code. This manipulation was included to represent cyber rules of
engagement, which require command authorization before executing sensitive missions. After requesting
the code, the mission commander responded with an authorization code in a variable amount of time
(between 10 and 60 seconds). While participants waited for authorization, they were permitted to move
on and complete other missions (but not subsequent steps in the same mission).
Measures
In this study, fan-out measures were customized for each participant from typing ability and
average response time for agents during a pre-experiment simulation. Prior to the experimental task, each
participant was asked to complete a typing test lasting two minutes. Words-per-minute results were
adjusted based on errors, and then multiplied by 5 to calculate estimated characters per minute (CPM;

Arif & Stuezlinger, 2009). Using the equation proposed by Olsen & Goodrich (2003), IT was calculated
by comparing the CPM to the average character length of agent execution commands (37 characters) and
NT was calculated from the average time it took an agent to execute a command (45 seconds).
Observed operator span-of-control was calculated as the maximum number of agents operating in
a one-minute window averaged across each 20 minute trial.
Participants
Twenty-one participants (17 Male, 4 Female), drawn from local universities and United States
Air-Force agencies, were financially compensated for their participation (on-duty Airmen received no
compensation outside of their regular duty pay). All participants were between the ages of 19 and 45 (M =
23.95, SD = 5.15) and had some level of experience with Command Line Interfaces (CLI) and/or
computer programming languages. Four participants had previous cyber security experience (classes,
professional experience, etc.).
Procedures
Experimental sessions were conducted in the AFRL Cyber Integrated Performance and Human
Effectiveness Research (CIPHER) Laboratory. Prior to the task, participants completed three phases of
training. First participants completed a short self-paced computer based training (CBT) which took
approximately 15 minutes. Following CBT, the researcher guided the participant through a short practice
scenario using the BOARD environment to familiarize themselves with the computer interface, task
requirements, and rule. Following the guided training scenario, participants were instructed to complete a
second training scenario independently, while the researcher observed their progress and corrected any
mistakes that were made. After the participant had reached satisfactory performance on the independent
training scenario, participants completed four experimental trials, each lasting 20 minute. During each
trial, participants were provided a different number of autonomous agents (4, 8, 12 or 16) with which to
complete their assigned missions. These manipulations were part of a larger investigation and are
peripheral to the central question of the current study (i.e., evaluation of the accuracy of fan-out measures
in cyber). As such, results pertaining to their effects on performance are being prepared for presentation
elsewhere. Estimates of operator span-of-control presented herein are means calculated across the four
scenarios. The total duration of the experiment was approximately 3 hours.
Results
Fan out estimations were calculated for each individual based on their typing speed (cpm; M =
264.29, SD = 70.33) and the average NT (45 seconds). Results showed no significant correlations
between fan-out estimates and actual span-of-control, r = 0.19, p > .05 (Figure 2).
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Figure 2. Participants Span-of-Control compared to Fan-Out Estimates
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However, consistent with prior research, fan out estimates were found to be significantly higher
than the actual span of control. A paired sample t-test revealed a significant difference between the
predicted fan-out values (M = 7.43, SD = 1.99) and average span-of-control (M = 2.27, SD = 0.49), t =
12.70, p < 0.05.
Discussion
Previous research has presented fan-out as a model upper bound of human span-of-control in
several HSC tasks (Crandall & Cummings, 2003). While it is to be expected that actual span-of-control
will fall below this value, generally these metrics have been found to be somewhat correlated (Cummings
& Mitchell, 2008). Surprisingly, we found that fan-out estimates were not significantly correlated with
observed span-of-control in the BOARD cyber HSC simulation. However, we did find a consistent
difference between the predicted values (via fan-out) and observed span-of-control. Given that observed
span-of-control fell well below the estimates (close to a 100% difference, as compared to the 30-50%
difference presented in other HSC tasks, e.g., Cummings & Mitchell, 2008), the current results suggest
that the inherent complexity of cyber operations entails a higher cognitive load, reducing operator span
well below fan-out estimates.
One caveat of these findings, however, is that fan-out was calculated from a relatively simplistic
formulation proposed by Cummings & Guerlain (2004); other researchers have proposed more complex
approximations. In their research, Mitchell, Cummings and Sheridan (2003) proposed the addition of wait
times to the denominator of the equation. In their expanded formula, wait time is a combination of the
time the asset spends in the queue before receiving instructions from the operator and time attributed to
operator reorientation and activities supporting situation awareness. Another interpretation by Crandall
and colleagues (2005) utilizes other metrics, such as neglect and interaction impact, to calculate an overall
performance metric for each asset based on all possible values for interaction and neglect time.
Conclusion
Building from previous HSC research, the purpose of this study was to investigate how the metric
of fan-out translated to cyber operations. Using a simulated autonomous agent control task, we evaluated
participants’ actual span-of-control, and compared them to the estimates calculated by a popular
interpretation of the fan-out equation. Our findings indicated that fan-out did not provide an accurate
representation of human performance in our task. Future research should focus on identifying the
cognitive requirements of cyber work, so that more mature equations for predicting span of control can be
developed.
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